Fact or fiction? A sensemaking perspective on the reality behind executives' perceptions of IT business value by Tallon, PP & Kraemer, KL
UC Irvine
UC Irvine Previously Published Works
Title
Fact or Fiction? A Sensemaking Perspective on the Reality Behind Executives' 
Perceptions of IT Business Value
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5fv9r2ns
Journal
Journal of Management Information Systems, 24(1)
ISSN
0742-1222
Authors
Tallon, Paul P
Kraemer, Kenneth L
Publication Date
2007-07-01
DOI
10.2753/mis0742-1222240101
License
CC BY 4.0
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Journal of Management Information Systems / Summer 2007, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 13–54. 
© 2007 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
0742–1222 / 2007 $9.50 + 0.00. 
DOI 10.2753/MIS0742-1222240101
Fact or Fiction? A Sensemaking  
Perspective on the Reality Behind 
Executives’ Perceptions of  
IT Business Value
PAUL P. TALLON AND KENNETH L. KRAEMER
PAUL P. TALLON is an Assistant Professor of Information Systems at the Wallace E. 
Carroll School of Management, Boston College, and a Research Associate at the Center 
for Research on Information Technology and Organizations (CRITO), University of 
California, Irvine. He previously worked as an IT auditor and chartered accountant 
with PricewaterhouseCoopers in Dublin, Ireland, and New York. His research has 
appeared in, or is forthcoming in, the Journal of Management Information Systems, 
Communications of the ACM, Communications of the AIS, and the Journal of Global 
IT Management. His research interests span the economic, social, and organizational 
impacts of IT; strategic alignment; real options; IT portfolio analysis; and the econom-
ics of data management. He recently coedited with Robert Kauffman, University of 
Minnesota, a volume of the Advances in Management Information Systems, entitled 
Economics, Information Systems and Electronic Commerce Research II: Advanced 
Empirical Methodologies, published by M.E. Sharpe.
KENNETH L. KRAEMER is a Professor of Information Systems and Director of the Center 
for Research on IT and Organizations (CRITO) at the Paul Merage School of Business, 
University of California, Irvine. His research interests span the social implications 
of IT, national policies for IT production and use, resulting in a book entitled Asia’s 
Computer Challenge (Oxford University Press, 1998), and the contributions of IT to 
productivity and economic development. His most recent book is Globalization of 
E-Commerce (Cambridge University Press, 2006). He is starting a new study of the 
offshoring of knowledge work.
ABSTRACT: Although research has made significant strides in recent years in evaluating 
the performance impacts from information technology (IT), a dearth of easily accessible 
objective measures, particularly at the process level, continues to limit IT research. 
Suggestions that researchers use perceptual measures instead are met with claims that 
the biased nature of perceptions renders them imperfect proxies for the true extent 
of IT impacts. In this paper, we use sensemaking theory to explore this claim. We 
outline a model relating what executives notice about process-level IT impacts with 
sensemaking-based perceptions of IT impacts at the ﬁrm level, and ﬁrm performance 
as the ultimate arbiter of perceptual accuracy. Estimating the model with survey data 
from executives in 196 ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that executives’ perceptions are more fact than 
ﬁction. While perceptions are not a perfect proxy for hard-to-ﬁnd objective measures, 
perceptual accuracy should stimulate greater consideration of executives’ perceptions 
in future IT business value research.
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DESPITE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN RECENT YEARS in evaluating the performance impacts 
of information technology (IT) [48, 56], executives remain frustrated at the lack of 
metrics to assess the true value of IT to their ﬁrms [38]. Behind this frustration lies a 
sense that aggregating IT impacts into ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial measures such as sales [4, 
12, 15, 50], value added [30, 36], ﬁnancial accounting ratios such as return on assets 
[65], or costs [1] does not adequately convey the broad diversity of effects, nor do 
such measures necessarily align with ﬁrms’ goals for IT [41]. Instead, executives have 
risen to the challenge of assessing IT impacts by supplementing internal data analysis 
(if any exists) with insight, intuition, perception, or gut feel to instinctively decide if, 
and to what extent, IT is delivering on its promise [81, 82].
From a research perspective, the absence of easily accessible objective measures 
of IT impacts at both the process and ﬁrm levels represents a barrier that researchers 
have long struggled to overcome. Any inclination to use executives’ perceptions in 
lieu of objective data has struggled against claims of bias or subjectivity [20, 53], 
notwithstanding the fact that perceptions have been found accurate in other contexts 
[85]. The perceptual accuracy of IT impacts is a different matter, however, something 
that cannot easily be inferred or extrapolated from other contexts, and yet research has 
not, to this point, tried to deﬁnitively conﬁrm or deny the accuracy of perceptions of IT 
impacts. In this research, we examine the accuracy of executives’ perceptions through 
the lens of sensemaking theory with the aim of reassuring or dissuading researchers 
from using perceptual measures of IT impacts in future research. Our analysis will 
reveal an enlightening sense of reality behind executives’ perceptions of IT impacts, 
a reality that has long been overlooked by researchers, potentially to the detriment of 
IT research. However, more than simply discovering that perceptions are accurate, our 
analysis offers a basis for researchers to expand their portfolio of IT impact measures 
(beyond already established objective measures) by translating what executives notice 
into research constructs. Researchers have long struggled against claims that perceptual 
measures of IT impacts are ﬂawed. Our results help to counter such claims and yet, 
given the relative ease with which perceptions can be collected from executives, we 
also sound a word of caution against opening the ﬂoodgates to wholesale adoption of 
perceptual measures in lieu of objective measures.
Sensemaking and Perceptions
Although perceptions have been criticized for reasons of bias and subjectivity, percep-
tions do not exist in a vacuum. Research in psychology and organizational studies has 
found that executives engage in a complex cognitive process of observing (noticing) 
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and analyzing (sensemaking) events to discover, interpret, and react to informational 
cues in the environment [34, 77, 87]. With respect to the complex task of evaluating 
the performance impacts of IT, executives have accordingly devised intricate noticing 
and sensemaking routines to perceptually infer the existence, absence, and sufﬁciency 
of IT effects within their ﬁrms. Sensemaking theory recognizes that individuals some-
times ﬁt information into preconceived notions of the world. Individuals see only what 
they want to see, so that what may seem obvious to one person is readily dismissed 
by another. Depending on how executives ﬁlter information on IT impacts, this could 
mean that executives maintain a distorted sense of reality and that their perceptions 
are so manipulated and counterfactual as to be of questionable value in any research 
context. However, if executives’ perceptions of IT impacts are accurate (meaning 
objectively veriﬁable), then the sensemaking processes that yield such perceptions 
become an important vehicle for discovering what executives notice about IT. Thus, 
if executives’ perceptions of IT impacts coincide with measures based on income, 
sales, productivity, or other broadly accepted ﬁnancial metrics, we can dissect the 
sensemaking process to learn what executives are noticing and leverage this to expand 
our repertoire of IT impact measures.1
Our research focuses on the following questions: First, to what extent are ex-
ecutives’ perceptions of IT impacts consistent with reality as revealed in objective 
measures of IT impacts? Second, beyond perceptual accuracy, can we identify what 
executives are noticing in relation to IT business value? To address both questions, 
our paper is structured as follows: First, we review sensemaking theory, leading to 
a conceptual model linking perceptions of IT impacts at the process level (a level 
that marks the locus of noticing or fact gathering as described later) with percep-
tions of IT impacts at the ﬁrm level (the locus of sensemaking) and traditional ﬁ-
nancial measures of ﬁrm performance. We then outline an instrument and measures 
to evaluate perceptual accuracy. We use a two-step approach to formally test our 
model and hypotheses, ﬁrst using survey data from executives in 196 ﬁrms, followed 
by an assessment of interrater reliability using survey data from 88 executives in 
seven ﬁrms. Finally, we review our results with a view to resolving the fact or ﬁc-
tion issue that has stymied the broader use of perceptual measures in studies of IT 
impacts, identify weaknesses in our methods and data, and offer some suggestions 
for future research.
Theoretical Background
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY DEFINES PERCEPTION AS “the act of apprehending material objects 
or qualities through the senses.”2 The focus of this deﬁnition is on external stimuli 
and how they are interpreted by the individual through sensory ﬁlters. Sensemaking 
theory uses this idea of discovery to develop a framework that maps the cognitive 
processes involved in sensing, weighing, and synthesizing external stimuli into a single 
point or statement of belief [77, 87], and so sensemaking can be loosely deﬁned as 
the “reciprocal interaction of information seeking, meaning ascription and action” 
[83, p. 240].
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Sensemaking recognizes that individuals’ interpretation of facts can be distorted de-
liberately (for example, if a rote answer is provided) or unintentionally (if individuals’ 
innate characteristics lead them to omit, exaggerate, or misinterpret the facts). Weick 
presents seven properties of sensemaking that show how individuals “concerned with 
identity in the context of others engage ongoing events from which they extract cues 
and make plausible sense retrospectively” [87, p. 18]. As noted in the deﬁnition of 
sensemaking, these seven properties (Table 1) synthesize how individuals extract cues 
from their environment and then, through a cognitive process, form an impression of 
their surroundings that may encompass (if bias, error, or distortion negatively affects 
their thought processes) more than what the bare facts alone might reveal. These 
properties can be further divided into three areas: the ﬁrst pertaining to individuals 
and their belief systems, the second to noticing or extraction of informational cues, 
and the third to plausibility. Of these properties, the one that is directly relevant to our 
analysis of perceptual accuracy is plausibility, which, as a terminal statement of belief 
or the culmination of sensemaking, is what ultimately must be evaluated for accuracy 
[87]. Using these properties to probe the thought processes underlying perceptions 
of IT impacts gives researchers an opportunity to peer inside the minds of executives 
and test whether certain factors, cited by many as a source of bias, are so severe as to 
erode all conﬁdence in executives’ perceptions. We now offer a brief synopsis of each 
property and its meaning in the context of perceptions of IT impacts.
As seen in Table 1, identity construction suggests that in interacting with researchers, 
executives try to project a sense of personal accomplishment and success. This form 
of selective bias echoes a widely held view that chief information ofﬁcers (CIO) will 
report higher IT impacts than non-IT executives. Even if business executives are less 
likely to exaggerate, there is still some debate over whether business executives know 
enough to truly give an accurate and thoughtful opinion. While sensemaking theory 
does not resolve this debate, it means that researchers must be careful in selecting 
their respondents to minimize the potential for bias.
Executives’ perceptions are retrospectively shaped by earlier experience [55], previ-
ous social contacts with executives from other ﬁrms, reports of IT success stories in 
the media, analysis from colleagues and subordinates, and business intelligence tools 
such as the balanced scorecard [28, 86]. Sensemaking is ongoing rather than discon-
tinuous, so perceptions may be slow to change in the face of disconﬁrming evidence, 
a feature seen in other contexts, such as when ﬁrms continue, rather than halt, derailed 
software projects despite clear evidence of failure [75]. Ongoing also means noticing 
facts or informational cues over an extended period of time, although recency effects 
would suggest that later-stage events receive a disproportionate weighting in how 
perceptions are formed [23].
When executives engage in sensemaking, they enact an environment or model 
of the world where information is processed according to certain rules. The adage 
“When you’ve seen one, you’ve seen them all” captures the essence of a worldview 
in which executives feel that IT must behave in a certain way—a belief that can al-
low invalid causal effects to enter the sensemaking process. For example, executives 
may believe that if their ﬁrm is spending a substantial amount on IT, then IT payoffs 
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must correspondingly be high. This aspect of sensemaking recognizes the ability of 
attitudes and beliefs to shape perceptions. For example, research ﬁnds that execu-
tives’ attitudes toward IT can determine a ﬁrm’s progressive use of IT [18, 37], while 
Broadbent and Weill [13] posit a relationship between executives’ perceptions of the 
role of IT infrastructure, the perceived value of that infrastructure, and their subsequent 
IT investment biases. Since attitudes toward IT can vary even among executives in 
the same ﬁrm, it is possible that executives perceive the same IT impacts in different 
ways. For example, a failing project might be interpreted by one executive as evidence 
that IT is failing overall while another considers it an outlier rather than prima facie 
evidence of systemic failure. Thus, attitudes and beliefs can shape how executives 
notice and make sense of IT. At the same time, attitudes can be falsiﬁed to conform 
to what others feel is appropriate [87]. As a result, any attempt to examine perceptual 
accuracy must pay particular attention to socially derived biases as described in the 
last paragraph and to biases associated with executives’ attempts to enact a worldview 
with predeﬁned ideas of how IT should relate to ﬁrm performance.
As individuals move toward a plausible outcome, they iterate between fact gather-
ing, weighting, and interpretation [87]. The outcome of this process may not reﬂect 
all information because of timing or cognitive limitations (if there is insufﬁcient time 
to weigh all information or if information overload leads to selective censoring). Per-
ceptions may therefore not be entirely accurate, but, in the subconscious reasoning of 
executives who are trying to give a reasoned response to the question of IT value, it is 
accurate enough. Not unlike the polarization seen in hung juries, further sensemaking 
or deliberation may not bring about a change in opinion. Hence, plausibility is a form 
of sensemaking through rational satisﬁcing [78, 83].
In looking across these properties, particularly those involving characteristics of 
the individual, it should be clear that not all executives are created equal. It may not 
simply be enough to pick executives at random and ask them what they feel about 
IT impacts. For plausibility to have any chance of mirroring reality, executives must 
have an ability to notice IT impacts, just as juries cannot be expected to render an 
accurate verdict unless they have ﬁrst been presented with the evidence. This could 
mean that by virtue of visibility into the ﬁrm, senior executives have a greater likeli-
hood of perceiving IT impacts, though it does not rule out midtier managers with broad 
functional experience. Irrespective of seniority, executives may want to hype their 
views of IT impacts in order to avoid embarrassment and to convey a personal sense 
of achievement. Equally, if noticing is limited for any reason, there is a real risk that 
managers will resort to inference to ﬁll in the gaps in their thinking. Our challenge, 
therefore, is to assess whether any deviation between plausibility and reality is so 
small as to be immaterial, or so large and inescapable as to cast a cloud of suspicion 
over executives’ perceptions and their broader use in IT impact research.
Findings from Previous Research
While perceptions have been widely accepted in certain areas of the information 
systems (IS) literature, most notably in end-user computing satisfaction [31] and IT 
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usage studies [24], the idea of using executives’ perceptions to assess IT impacts is 
controversial [20]. Although not developed using sensemaking theory per se, prior 
research has documented conﬂicting evidence as to the accuracy of executives’ per-
ceptions. For example, Mezias and Starbuck [57] ﬁnd signiﬁcant error in managers’ 
recall of earlier ﬁrm performance. However, in reappraising their ﬁndings, Maule and 
Hodgkinson note that “the cognitive strategies underlying managerial perceptions may 
be functional in the everyday organizational context where feedback induced revision 
is possible” [53, p. 35]. In a further critique of perceptual measures, Straub et al. ﬁnd 
signiﬁcant differences between computer-recorded and self-reported system usage 
measures, leading them to claim that “research that has relied on subjective measures 
of system usage . . . may be artifactual” [79, p. 1328].
Elsewhere, perceptual measures of ﬁrm performance have been found to correlate 
with objective measures, leading Venkatraman and Ramanujam to argue that “per-
ceptual data from senior managers, which tend to strongly correlate with [objective 
data], can be employed as acceptable operationalizations of [ﬁrm performance]” [85, p. 
118]. In assessing perceptual measures of ﬁrm performance involving multiple execu-
tives in manufacturing ﬁrms, Ketokivi and Schroeder similarly argue that “perceptual 
measures are not ‘ﬁction’ as some proponents of operational deﬁnitions may argue” 
[44, p. 262]. Reacting to claims of forgetfulness in managers’ ability to accurately 
recall what business strategy their ﬁrms used in the past, a claim that could distort how 
information is aggregated into an overall perception of IT impacts, Miller et al. note 
that “retrospective reporting is a viable research methodology if the measure used to 
generate the reports is adequately reliable and valid” [58, p. 189]. Finally, in a study 
of end-user satisfaction with data, Karimi et al. identify positive and signiﬁcant cor-
relations between perceptual and objective measures of environmental uncertainty, 
dispelling “the notion that CEOs’ perceptions are inclined to be imprecise, erroneous, 
or inferior to objective measures” [39, p. 185].
While these studies might, on balance, say that executives’ perceptions are accurate, 
extrapolating from this performance context to the case of IT impacts would be a 
giant leap of faith. The noticing and sensemaking processes that executives use to 
evaluate IT impacts are very different from those used to evaluate ﬁrm performance. 
Perceptual recall of ﬁrm performance can be unambiguous when an executive can 
point to a line item in a published report, but with IT impacts there are no such reports 
and so IT impacts remain highly uncertain. Sensemaking of IT impacts involves a 
complex interplay between expectations, identiﬁcation of objective facts regarding 
IT impacts, and how this information is subsequently used to create an overall per-
ception. While it is useful that research has found evidence of perceptual accuracy 
elsewhere, IT impacts present a very different set of challenges, and yet, as Mezias 
and Starbuck argue, “many research studies rely on managers’ perceptions . . . yet 
almost no research has examined the accuracy of these perceptions” [57, p. 7]. In 
the next section, we introduce a conceptual model and hypotheses to address this 
lack of prior research.
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Research Model
WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT REVERSE ENGINEERING the process by which executives perceive 
IT impacts is highly complex, the distinction between noticing (fact gathering) and 
sensemaking (fact interpretation) that lies at the heart of sensemaking theory requires 
us to ﬁrst examine how executives notice IT impacts; only then can we validate the 
information that executives cite as being instrumental in their evaluation. As Starbuck 
and Milliken report, “if events are noticed, people make sense of them; and if events 
are not noticed, they are not available for sensemaking” [77, p. 60]. Noticing is largely 
involuntary in that individuals do not purposefully set out to scan their surroundings 
in search of facts and opinions, and so the sources of noticing can include much more 
than ofﬁcial management reports and individual IT project analyses [87].
Noticing as a Prelude to Sensemaking:  
A Process Perspective
Starbuck and Milliken argue that “noticing may be at least as important to effective 
problem solving as sensemaking” [77, p. 36] but that the challenge is in deciding at 
what level within the ﬁrm noticing is most likely to occur. From the perspective of 
IT impacts, if the locus of noticing is deep within the ﬁrm at, for example, the ap-
plication level, the enormity of the sensemaking task would be overwhelming since 
executives would need to identify and weigh the effect of all applications in order to 
form an aggregate view of the contribution of IT to ﬁrm performance. Researchers 
would face an equally arduous task to compile a list of applications for veriﬁcation 
purposes, a list that is sure to vary between ﬁrms. At a more macro level, such as 
a division or business unit, the opposite problem arises if executives fail to notice 
sufﬁcient information from which to draw an accurate conclusion. Complicating this 
issue is the fact that some lower-tier executives may have limited knowledge of IT 
impacts, making it difﬁcult, for example, for a vice president of sales to extrapolate 
from a relatively narrow domain to a broad sense of how IT has affected costs, proﬁt, 
or productivity. In this way, the locus of noticing and the identity of the noticer are 
closely related and so any attempt to validate executives’ perceptions using objec-
tive ﬁrm-level data must ﬁrst try to ﬁnd a locus of noticing and an executive who, 
by noticing IT impacts in several areas of the ﬁrm, can formulate a plausible but yet 
reasonably accurate ﬁrmwide perception of IT impacts.3
A possible solution to this challenge can be found in the literature where researchers 
have called for measuring effects at an intermediate or process level using the argument 
that “the primary economic impacts or contributions (to performance) of information 
technology (if any) can be measured at lower operational levels in an enterprise” [8, p. 
6]. Kohli further argues that IT impacts are “more likely to be detected at the process 
level than at the ﬁrm level” [47, p. 25], while elsewhere researchers have lobbied for 
process-level measures on the basis that the data they provide to management are 
more actionable and reﬂective of the strategic goals behind IT investment [3, 40, 56, 
81, 82]. As Barua and Mukhopadhyay [7] and Melville et al. [56] note in their review 
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of the literature, if IT impacts are likely to materialize within individual business 
processes, in time these effects will aggregate up to the ﬁrm level. If this means that 
the primary locus of IT impacts is at the process level, then a sensemaking exercise 
that asks executives to identify IT impacts could focus on perceptions of IT impacts 
at the process level, or more speciﬁcally, perceptions of how IT has affected critical 
activities within each process [81, 82].
If the process level is the preferred locus of noticing, it follows that senior execu-
tives, rather than functional managers, are more likely to have visibility into multiple 
processes. Senior executives may not be able to cite speciﬁc effects for individual 
applications but, at a process level, they may be able to give general insights into 
whether IT has allowed their ﬁrm to improve sales by customizing products and ser-
vices or whether IT has allowed the ﬁrm to lower costs through greater quality control. 
In the same way that empirical studies ﬁnd a link between IT impacts at the process 
and ﬁrm levels, whatever effects are perceived at the process level should affect ﬁrm 
performance. We employ sensemaking theory below to examine this relationship in 
more detail, leading to a series of three hypotheses to evaluate the accuracy of execu-
tives’ perceptions. In Figure 1, we provide an overview of our conceptual model and 
hypotheses.
Relating Noticing to Sensemaking
If research suggests that executives are more likely to ﬁrst notice IT impacts at the 
process level, how will this shape their perceptions of IT impacts at the ﬁrm level? 
Sensemaking theory helps to answer this question by focusing on the retrospective 
and ongoing nature of sensemaking. In explaining the roots of sensemaking, Weick 
invokes cognitive dissonance theory to explain how “post-decision outcomes are 
used to reconstruct pre-decisional histories” [87, p. 12]. What this means is that if 
individuals are asked to retrospectively explain their point of view, they will do so by 
selectively recalling variables that appear to prospectively endorse their espoused view. 
This phenomenon is often observed in juries—cited by Weick [87] as a motivating 
factor behind sensemaking theory—where jurors cite speciﬁc facts in support of their 
verdict. In the IS literature, Seligman [70] uses this idea of retrospective justiﬁcation or 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model—Linking Perception to Reality
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selective recall to show how users justify a decision to not adopt a new technology by 
emphasizing negative characteristics of the system. Similarly, Grifﬁth [34] reveals how 
users make sense of system features by retrospectively attaching a concrete, abstract, 
core, or tangential label to each feature in a way that justiﬁes later adoption.
In the context of perceptions of IT impacts, asking executives to explain why they 
hold a particular ﬁrm-level opinion (for example, if they perceive that IT is having a 
signiﬁcant effect on ﬁrm proﬁtability) will lead them to retrospectively recall examples 
of process-level effects that fully support their ﬁrm-level beliefs. Any data that might 
conﬂict with their ﬁrm-level views are unlikely to be reported even if such data are 
noticed. Since this aspect of sensemaking theory suggests that executives will rarely 
contradict themselves in citing data that substantiate their point of view, it means 
that researchers attempting to validate executives’ perceptions of IT impacts would 
be well advised to not give executives a blank sheet to report what they notice—the 
result would be tautological. Instead, we can use the prospective reasoning aspect of 
sensemaking to present executives with a general, structured list of possible process-
level impacts, asking them to report if they noticed each effect, and only then asking 
them if they think IT has had an effect on their ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance. This 
approach emphasizes plausibility as executives cognitively weigh and aggregate what 
they notice into an overall perception. Consistent with the argument given in Star-
buck and Milliken [77] showing how noticing and sensemaking are closely related, 
an executive who perceives or notices that IT is having a positive effect on different 
business processes is likely to perceive that IT is also having a positive effect at the 
ﬁrm level. We summarize this argument in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Perceptions of IT impacts at the process level (the locus of notic-
ing) are positively related to perceptions of IT impacts at the ﬁrm level (the locus 
of sensemaking).
Linking Perception to Reality
While theory posits a tight link between noticing and sensemaking, it imposes nothing 
more than plausibility requirements on executives who, in good faith, are trying to 
interpret what they see happening in their environment. However, while sensemaking 
theory does not insist on accuracy, it also does not preclude accuracy [77, 87]. For 
example, in a health-care setting, Thomas et al. [83] found a link between information 
scanning and interpretation (reﬂective of noticing and sensemaking) and subsequent 
hospital performance. Weick [87] posits that plausibility trumps accuracy for three 
primary reasons.4 First, if there is a low signal-to-noise ratio where noticed data are 
either unavailable or untrustworthy, sensemaking can be based on incomplete data 
processing. Second, the argument that “accuracy is meaningless when used to describe 
a ﬁltered sense of the present, linked with a reconstruction of the past, that has been 
edited in hindsight” [87, p. 57] echoes an earlier comment regarding selective recall 
which leads to an opinionated version of reality rather than a more general sense of 
reality [87]. Third, perceptual accuracy can suffer if executives are called to make 
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decisions without fully understanding the data that inform their decision. In this 
case, accuracy suffers if decisions must be made quickly, perhaps before all relevant 
data have been considered. Consistent with Thomas et al. [83], perceptual accuracy 
improves if these three conditions are removed or otherwise controlled through ap-
propriate research design as attempted in this study.
In the case of IT impacts, information overload can be controlled, as indicated earlier, 
by focusing on perceptions at the process level rather than inundating executives with 
application-level data. There is, therefore, less need for noticing and so sensemaking 
theory would support higher accuracy. Instrument design, as we describe later, can 
steer noticing in a particular direction, away from the minutiae of particular applica-
tions (noise) and toward higher-order process-level effects (signal). This helps to limit 
selective recall, which will improve the odds that what is considered plausible is in 
fact accurate, or as Starbuck and Milliken argue, “ﬁltered information is less accurate 
but, if the ﬁltering is effective, more understandable” [77, p. 41]. Last, perceptions of 
IT impacts evolve over a period of time rather than being spur-of-the-moment deci-
sions. As noted in our earlier literature review, executives recognize that IT is used 
for both operational and strategic purposes, and so effects tend to be judged with 
performance impacts expectations in mind [82]. Elsewhere the literature shows how 
IT use is tied to perceptions of expected value and managerial knowledge of IT [11]. 
Using sensemaking theory, these arguments suggest that, despite the complex nature 
of IT investment evaluation, executives have access to sufﬁcient amounts of noticed 
data, have seen how past IT investments have performed, and are not under any obvi-
ous time pressures or restrictions to give a response to a question asking whether IT is 
affecting ﬁrm performance without ﬁrst having sufﬁcient noticed data on hand.
What sensemaking theory is effectively telling us is that factors that conspire to distort 
perceptual accuracy can be controlled in certain cases. Researchers who have found 
evidence of perceptual accuracy in non-IT contexts have been able to control these 
factors in the course of their analyses [39, 44, 58, 85]. Absent the possible intrusion 
of extraneous factors on the sensemaking process—factors that relate to executives’ 
enactment of a sensible environment and social inﬂuences, as discussed in Table 
1—there is every reason to argue that what executives notice, and their subsequent 
sensemaking, is accurate and fully consistent with reality. Again, focusing on the case 
of IT impacts, sensemaking theory suggests that what executives notice at the process 
level is derived from reality, and so if executives say that IT is having an effect on 
various business processes, these perceptions should reﬂect the underlying reality. In 
our case, reality is manifested in how a ﬁrm has actually performed, as seen through 
ﬁnancial criteria such as sales, proﬁt, or market share. Similarly, if sensemaking is a 
direct abstraction of what has been noticed, and what is noticed is real, then sensemak-
ing must also be real. These arguments suggest the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between perceptions of IT impacts 
at the ﬁrm level (the locus of sensemaking) and objective measures of ﬁrm per-
formance.
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Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between perceptions of IT impacts 
at the process level (the locus of noticing) and objective measures of ﬁrm per-
formance.
Operationalizing the Model
Noticing (Process-Level Perceptual Measures)
MOONEY ET AL. [60] ARGUE THAT IT AFFECTS the firm through operational and manage-
ment processes. Operational processes such as production, design, and marketing are 
consistent with the primary activities in the value chain, while management processes 
such as control and communication are more reﬂective of support activities [63]. Us-
ing the generic value chain as a model of the ﬁrm, and with primary activities as the 
most likely target of IT spending, we identiﬁed ﬁve processes around which to col-
lect IT impact data: supplier relations (inbound logistics), production and operations, 
product and service enhancement, sales and marketing support, and customer relations 
(outbound logistics). Then, using survey instruments previously created by Mahmood 
and Soon [51], Sethi and King [71], and Tallon et al. [82]—instruments that in each 
case identify ways in which IT creates value through process-level activities—we 
identiﬁed a short list of 20 items (four items per process) to capture perceptual data 
on IT impacts at each point in the value chain. Building these items into an executive 
survey, respondents were asked: “To what extent does IT contribute to the overall 
performance of your company along each of the following dimensions? Please limit 
your appraisal to realized, not expected impacts.” This question helps to emphasize 
the retrospective property of sensemaking by drawing attention to past events. On the 
basis of pilot testing and informal feedback from several CIOs and business executives, 
item responses used a 10-point Likert scale where 1 denotes “weak realized impacts” 
and 10 denotes “strong realized impacts.”
Sensemaking (Firm-Level Perceptual Measures)
We also designed four items to assess the output of executives’ sensemaking. These 
items reﬂect executives’ perceptions of the effect of IT on ﬁrm performance and 
are meant to reﬂect a synthesis and integration of what executives notice about IT 
impacts at the process level, but in a way that anchors each item to a speciﬁc aspect 
of ﬁrm performance. As a result, we selected measures that are easily understood by 
executives, that had been used in prior research on IT impacts [25, 48], and more 
importantly, could be corroborated using data from published ﬁnancial statements. In 
this way, we designed four items to assess executives’ perceptions of the effect of IT 
on proﬁt margin, market share, labor costs, and selling, general, and administration 
(SG&A) costs. While this short list is not exhaustive, these four measures are widely 
seen as central to performance assessment [25].
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Firm Performance (Measures of Reality)
In order to ensure consistency between sensemaking measures and measures of 
ﬁrm performance, we selected four widely known accounting measures: margin (or 
income as a percentage of sales), market share, labor costs as a percentage of sales, 
and SG&A as a percentage of sales.5 These measures focus on proﬁtability, market 
expansion, and cost avoidance, areas that are broadly targeted for IT investment [82] 
and have been used previously in research by Bharadwaj [9], Mitra and Chaya [59], 
and Sircar et al. [74].6
Potential Biases and Sensemaking Distortion Measures
As previously noted in our review of sensemaking theory, there are several possible 
forms of bias that could cause executives’ perceptions to diverge from reality. In prac-
tice, it is impossible to isolate and control for all biases, particularly those associated 
with emotion or that occur at random. For example, the fact that an executive is having 
a bad day could introduce an uncontrollable degree of distortion into the sensemak-
ing process. Instead, we try to focus on systematic biases relating to the social and 
enactment of sensible environment properties of sensemaking, as noted in Table 1. 
Organizational behaviorists refer to such biases as contrast effects [68].
From the viewpoint of social inﬂuences, contrast effects explain how, in an effort 
to save face and project a sense of personal or professional success, executives look 
past their ﬁrm’s boundaries for copy-cat inﬂuences that indicate expected or desired 
outcomes rather than actual outcomes [76]. Executives are social beings whose interac-
tion with individuals both inside and outside the ﬁrm can help to frame their thinking 
on a given subject and their overall attitude toward IT [86]. Such interactions can be 
a key source of information on IT impacts to the extent that executives are exposed to 
the views (good or bad) of others. However, it can also happen that executives simply 
regurgitate what they hear from others regarding IT impacts. If so, other individuals’ 
biases can be inherited if executives fail to discern the truth in what they are being told; 
worse still, they might embellish what they hear. For those executives whose views 
on IT impacts are shaped by what they hear from their CIO (who not surprisingly 
may want to give an inﬂated assessment of how IT has performed), the extent of bias 
can be especially severe. Controlling for such biases is complex but, as sensemaking 
theory notes, these must be evaluated before perceptual accuracy can be proven [57, 
78]. Accordingly, three items were created to assess IT–business interaction as a source 
of noticed (and potentially biased) information, namely, IS executive participation in 
strategic planning (ten-point Likert scale), IS executive involvement in business is-
sues (three-point ordinal scale), and IS executive involvement in executive committee 
meetings (four-point ordinal scale). The text of each item (see Table 2) reﬂects previous 
research by Reich and Benbasat [66] and Jarvenpaa and Ives [37].
A further source of social bias involves executives’ attitudes toward IT. Executives 
in ﬁrms with strategic goals for IT might bias their perceptions of IT impacts to con-
form to what is expected of strategic IT. Prior research identiﬁes a series of critical 
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goals for IT ranging from automation of utility applications and manual processes to 
the use of IT as an agent or catalyst in organizational transformation [35, 61, 84, 89]. 
Accordingly, four measures were designed to reﬂect different goals for IT (see Table 
2). Respondents were asked to declare their agreement with each item on a ten-point 
Likert scale. Subsequent analysis found that these four items divided into two fac-
tors: three items identiﬁed a factor relating to the strategic role of IT while a fourth 
revealed a utility role for IT [82]. Accordingly, we decided to treat these measures as 
two separate factors labeled strategic IT and utility IT in our later analysis. Finally, 
we used a single item (ﬁve-point ordinal scale) to highlight the existence and sophis-
tication of IT strategy on the basis that executives may base their perception on the 
expectations inherent in such a strategy. The text of this item was based on previous 
research by Reich and Benbasat [66] and Parsons [61].
In using contrast effects to identify how attempts to enact a sensible environment 
can lead to bias and distortion, we can see how inadequate noticed data can lead 
executives to supplement whatever data do exist with data drawn from competitors, 
ﬁrms of equal size, or those with an established record of IT success. Mezias and 
Starbuck [57] also report that managers resort to managerial folklore or anecdotes to 
augment a lack of direct personal experience. Regarding IT impacts, this could mean 
that executives subconsciously adapt what they hear or read about IT in other ﬁrms to 
their own speciﬁc circumstances. For perceptual accuracy to hold, these factors must 
also have minimal inﬂuence on the sensemaking process.
As indicated in the bottom panel of Table 2, we operationalize the enactment of 
sensible environment property in four ways. First, to identify if executives’ perceptions 
are colored by competitors’ success or by size comparisons, we consider the sales of 
the ﬁve largest ﬁrms in each industry, a proxy for each ﬁrm’s largest competitors and 
representative of those most likely to be used by executives as a contrast as they struggle 
to make sense of their own IT impacts. Second, we also consider the proﬁts of these ﬁve 
largest ﬁrms. Third, we use the absolute amount of IT spending per employee in each 
ﬁrm, and, fourth, the rate of IT spending (IT spending as a percentage of sales), both 
standardized to reﬂect a degree of deviation from an industry mean. Both IT spending 
measures provide important insight into the confounding effects of IT budgets to the 
extent that executives feel that IT spending (either in absolute or relative terms) should 
be strongly correlated with IT impacts. These measures can help executives to build 
a sense of identity that they then project to the outside world in reporting how IT has 
affected their ﬁrm. These measures are also reﬂective of a worldview where execu-
tives deﬁne rules for how their ﬁrm ought to perform—rules that link IT impacts with 
spending levels or that exonerate the executives from having to methodically process 
the information that they notice on IT impacts at the process level.
Robust Assessment of Perceptual Accuracy
While H2 is a necessary test of perceptual accuracy—determining if perceptions of IT 
impacts are consistent with ﬁnancial reality—support for H2 is not sufﬁcient to conﬁrm 
that executives’ perceptions are an accurate and reliable way to identify and rate IT 
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impacts. The reason for this heightened skepticism is not simply based on fears that 
sensemaking could be overwhelmed by bias, but that sensemaking could be covertly 
responding to other events besides IT impacts. Asking executives their opinion on what 
they consider to be the effect of IT on ﬁrm performance does not guarantee that their 
response will have any bearing on IT. Therefore, there needs to be an additional layer 
of perceptual testing that not only involves estimating the conceptual model shown 
in Figure 1, but that embeds within that model objective measures of IT impacts that 
serve as proxies for sensemaking-based perceptual measures.
As our sensemaking items reﬂect perceptions of IT impact on proﬁt margins, mar-
ket share, and labor and SG&A costs, we needed to identify comparable objective 
measures, and so we devised four ratio-like measures: income per IT dollar, sales per 
IT dollar, sales per employee (or productivity), and market share per rate of IT invest-
ment. Data for all four measures are available from ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial statements and IT 
budgets. As explained below, these four measures would then allow us to determine 
whether executives’ perceptions are indeed accurate and objectively veriﬁable. If 
what executives perceive about IT impacts is ﬁrmly grounded in reality, then their 
perceptions should correlate with objective measures of IT impacts.
If executives perceive that IT is enhancing proﬁt margins so that each dollar spent 
on IT leads to progressively higher proﬁtability, then we could uncover conﬁrmatory 
evidence of this if their perception correlates with a measure of income per IT dol-
lar. Equally, if IT is enhancing market share, this could be conﬁrmed by correlating 
executives’ perceptions with a measure of market share to IT spending. Dividing 
market share (a percentage) by IT spending (a dollar amount) would be awkward and 
so we instead use IT spending relative to sales as a denominator to create a measure 
of market share per rate of IT investment.
We considered using labor costs per IT dollar as a way to evaluate executives’ percep-
tions of the effect of IT on labor costs. However, since ﬁnancial reporting procedures 
afford considerable discretion in how ﬁrms account for labor costs, we could not be 
universally certain that what one ﬁrm treats as labor costs would not be treated as 
SG&A by another. For example, service ﬁrms tend to treat all labor costs as SG&A, 
while manufacturing ﬁrms tend to divide labor costs into blue-collar costs which are 
part of cost of goods sold and white-collar costs which are part of SG&A. Regardless 
of how ﬁrms account for labor costs, any reduction in labor costs attributable to IT 
should expand proﬁts, which we can corroborate using income per IT dollar. Equally, 
automation or substitution between labor and IT that leads to a fall in labor costs should 
be observable in ﬁrm productivity statistics as measured by sales per employee.
Similarly, identifying a suitable objective proxy measure of executives’ perceptions 
of the effect of IT on SG&A is challenging since ﬁnancial accounting rules allow 
ﬁrms to report SG&A costs separately from advertising, R&D, depreciation, and other 
costs, or to optionally aggregate and report all such costs under SG&A. Regardless of 
how ﬁrms account for SG&A, an IT-led reduction in SG&A will lead to an increase 
in proﬁt that can be corroborated using income per IT dollar. Furthermore, if IT 
reduces SG&A by automating aspects of sales, marketing, or customer service that 
allow ﬁrms to make more effective use of their remaining resources, we can expect 
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to see an improvement in productivity and an increase in sales [72]. Therefore, if 
executives perceive that IT is helping ﬁrms to reduce SG&A costs, we can conﬁrm 
this by correlating their perceptions with income per IT dollar and to a lesser extent 
with sales per IT dollar.
While these ratios are an attempt to capture some notion of output (performance) 
relative to input (IT), ratios can be misleading [52]. For example, sales per IT dol-
lar will likely increase in absolute terms if IT is used to improve customer loyalty, 
allowing ﬁrms to expand wallet share or sales per customer (the numerator expands 
faster than the denominator). However, sales per IT dollar could also increase if a 
ﬁrm was to scale back its IT spending without suffering a decline in overall sales (the 
denominator falls faster than the numerator). Thus, ratios can send mixed signals. To 
address this limitation in our measures, for each ﬁrm, we express each of the four 
objective measures as a deviation from their industry average.
Data Collection and Analysis
THE DATA FOR THIS STUDY WERE COLLECTED AS PART of the Intercorporate Measurement 
Program (IMP), a research program conducted during the late 1990s by the Center for 
Research on Information Technology and Organizations (CRITO) at the University 
of California, Irvine and CSC Index, the consulting division of Computer Sciences 
Corp. The sample frame for the research consisted of CSC’s North American client 
base. Packets containing an IT impacts survey and an IT spending survey (a survey 
of IT spending for the most recent year) were sent to the CIO of each ﬁrm with the 
request that the CIO personally complete the IT spending survey and forward the IT 
impacts survey to a business executive (at senior vice president (SVP) level or above) 
for completion. To protect the conﬁdentiality of business executives’ responses, a 
covering letter invited them to mail their survey directly to us rather than returning it 
through the ofﬁce of the CIO. 
From an initial mailing and subsequent phone follow-up, matched responses were 
received from 196 ﬁrms. Summary statistics are shown in Table 3. All IT spending 
surveys were completed by the CIO; 89.3 percent of our business executive surveys 
were completed by executives ranging in seniority from SVP to chief executive ofﬁcer 
(CEO). A comparison of our sample to the Fortune 500 on criteria such as revenues, 
income, and total assets failed to uncover signiﬁcant differences, allowing us to broadly 
generalize our ﬁndings to this group. We also ran a series of Kolmogorov–Smirnov 
and ANOVA tests to conﬁrm that our data are normal and not signiﬁcantly distorted 
by differences in respondent types.
Financial data for 1998, the year immediately following the survey, were extracted 
from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database and matched with the 196 ﬁrms in the 
survey. Productivity studies have used various time periods to model the interval be-
tween when IT investments are made and when the effects of those investments ﬁrst 
materialize in the ﬁnancial statements. For example, Brynjolfsson et al. [16] report 
that the effect from an initial IT investment is similar at the end of the ﬁrst and second 
year, but then climbs in the third year. Elsewhere, Devaraj and Kohli [29] report lags 
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on the order of six months or less, basing their assessment in part on interviews with 
hospital administrators, while Brynjolfsson et al. [17] ﬁnd that the effects of IT on 
reduced ﬁrm size become apparent after a two-year lag. Strictly speaking, our focus in 
this study is not on how long it takes for IT impacts to materialize but on the length of 
time that it takes for noticed IT impacts to materialize in the ﬁnancial statements. Our 
decision to consider a one-year lag is a compromise between the two-year window 
that empirical research has suggested as an appropriate time lag [16] and the shorter 
six-month interval reported by Devaraj and Kohli [27].
To address sources of bias, we extracted data from Compustat for over 2,500 ﬁrms 
whose four-digit SIC codes matched that of our sample. Grouping ﬁrms by four-digit 
SIC code allows us to determine overall industry sales and thus each ﬁrm’s approxi-
mate market share. We also compiled total sales and proﬁts for the ﬁve largest ﬁrms 
(by sales) in each four-digit SIC code. We used Information Week 500 data for 1998 
to identify industry average rates of IT spending, and then matched these data with 
each ﬁrm in our sample.
One could argue that the scale of IT’s impact on ﬁrm performance is not only 
reﬂective of current IT spending but the cumulative effect of IT spending over time 
as represented by IT capital. Accordingly, we acquired from Harte-Hanks data on IT 
capital at the end of 1997 from which we were able to extract data for 129 of the 196 
ﬁrms in our sample. IT capital is computed by Harte-Hanks (previously Computer 
Intelligence Infocorp) from aggregate site-level surveys of ﬁrms’ mainframes, PCs, 
servers, and other IT hardware. This measure of IT capital has been used extensively 
in productivity studies by Bresnahan et al. [12], Brynjolfsson and Hitt [15], Kudyba 
and Diwan [49], and Lehr and Lichtenberg [50], and hence has legitimacy among 
researchers. We, therefore, supplemented the three measures of IT impacts that used 
Table 3. Characteristics of the Sample (N = 196)
Variable Frequency Percent
Revenues (1998)
 Less than $500 million 9 4.6
 $500 million to $1 billion  30 15.3
 $1 billion to $5 billion  87 44.4
 $5 billion to $10 billion 36 18.4
 More than $10 billion 34 17.3
Industry Segment
 Paper and packaging 22 11.2
 Computers and electronics 23 11.7
 Chemicals and metals 11 5.6
 Utilities (electric or gas) 31 15.8
 Wholesale and retail trade 15 7.7
 Telecommunications 18 9.2
 Finance, insurance, and real estate 31 15.8
 Business and professional services 16 8.2
 Other 29 14.8
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IT spending (sales per IT dollar, income per IT dollar, and market share per rate 
of IT investment) with three measures based on IT capital. These three additional 
measures are: sales per IT capital dollar, income per IT capital dollar, and market 
share per IT capital dollar. Similar to our IT spending ratios, these IT capital ratios 
are open to interpretation and so each was normalized to reﬂect deviations from 
industry averages.
Measurement Model
To assess the psychometric properties of our items, we used partial least squares with 
PLSGraph7 to perform a factor analysis. This involved estimating a measurement 
model with 20 process-level items, divided into ﬁve factors with four process-level 
items each, four items denoting sensemaking perceptions of IT impacts at the ﬁrm-
level loading on one factor, four objective measures of ﬁrm performance loading on 
one factor, three items denoting the strategic role of IT loading on one factor, and 
three items denoting IT–business interaction also loading on one factor—single-
item constructs were not included in the analysis; reﬂective indicators were used 
throughout. While PLSGraph reports standardized factor loadings for each factor’s 
indicators, cross-loadings were found by computing factor scores for each factor (as 
the product of PLSGraph-generated indicator weights and the raw indicators), and 
then correlating each factor score with all indicators for all other factors. Descriptive 
data, factor loadings, and the text of each survey item appear in Table 4. All factor 
loadings exceed a suggested minimum of 0.6 [2], indicating that the structure of our 
ﬁrst-order factors is appropriate.8
We also used the measurement model to review convergent and discriminant validity 
of the items and constructs arising from our factor analysis. Convergent validity identi-
ﬁes if the indicators of a factor correlate higher with other indicators of the same factor 
than with indicators of a different factor, whereas discriminant validity determines if 
the indicators of a particular factor load higher on that factor than any other factor. 
In order for the factor structure to be valid, the shared variance (squared correlation) 
between each factor-pair must be less than the variance extracted for each factor [33]. 
The results of these validity checks appear in Table 5; convergent and discriminant 
validity are present throughout. Finally, composite reliability was also identiﬁed and 
found to exceed a suggested minimum of 0.7 for each construct [88].
Hypothesis Testing Using PLSGraph
To estimate our model, we ﬁrst created a second-order factor reﬂecting the ﬁve ﬁrst-
order factors denoting process-level IT impacts. This allowed us to test H1 as one 
path rather than ﬁve separate paths.9 We then estimated three models. As indicated 
in Figure 2, the ﬁrst model uses ﬁrm-level sensemaking or perceptual measures and 
includes a broad list of control variables to account for potential sources of bias and 
perceptual distortion. The second and third models, seen in Figure 3, use objective 
measures based on IT spending and IT capital as proxies for the perceptual sensemak-
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Figure 2. Standardized Path Estimates with Perceptual Measures of IT Impacts (N = 196)
Notes: Control variables denoting sensemaking biases: Enactment of sensible environment 
property: IT spending per employee (0.106, ns), rate of IT spending (0.039, ns), sales of 
the largest ﬁve competitors (–0.084, ns), proﬁt of the largest ﬁve competitors (0.056, ns). 
Social property: utility role of IT (–0.132, p < 0.01), strategic role of IT (0.163, p < 0.01), 
IT–business interaction (0.126, p < 0.01), nature of IT strategy (0.039, ns). * p < 0.05;  
** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; ns = not signiﬁcant.
Figure 3. Standardized Path Estimates with Objective Measures of IT Impacts 
Notes: The upper coefﬁcient (in italics) represents the path estimates for Model 2 (N = 196), 
which uses objective ﬁrm-level IT impact measures computed from IT spending as proxy 
measures for perceptual sensemaking, while the lower coefﬁcients reﬂect Model 3 (N = 129) 
where objective ﬁrm-level IT impact measures are instead based on IT capital. * p < 0.05; 
** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; ns = not signiﬁcant.
ing items used in Figure 2. Signiﬁcance levels were determined throughout on the 
basis of 1,000 bootstrap samples.
As seen in Figure 2, there is signiﬁcant (p < 0.001) support for H1 and H2, conﬁrming 
the tight link between noticing and sensemaking as argued by Starbuck and Milliken 
[77] and Weick [87]. This degree of signiﬁcance offers the ﬁrst sign of support for 
perceptual accuracy. Interestingly, the path representing H3 is insigniﬁcant. We found, 
however, that if this path was estimated separately (removing the paths for H1 and H2 
from the model), H3 became positive and signiﬁcant (0.241, p < 0.01). To understand 
why this path is insigniﬁcant in the overall model, it is ﬁrst necessary to recognize that 
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sensemaking mediates the link between perceptions of IT impacts at the process level 
and ﬁrm performance. As noted in Baron and Kenny [6] and Kenny [43], complete 
mediation occurs when the inclusion of a mediator causes the direct path to transition 
from signiﬁcant to insigniﬁcant. In this case, the inclusion of sensemaking causes the 
direct path (H3) to become insigniﬁcant. This is an important ﬁnding as regards our 
interpretation of sensemaking, for it shows that what executives notice about IT at 
the process level is fully encapsulated in their sensemaking views of IT impacts at 
the ﬁrm level—no further variance is explained by the inclusion of a direct path from 
noticing to reality. If H3 was still signiﬁcant in the overall model, it would indicate 
that executives have embellished, censored, or omitted certain noticed IT impacts from 
their sensemaking. The fact that H3 is insigniﬁcant, therefore, further strengthens our 
conﬁdence in the ability of executives to take what they see at the process level and 
to make sense of it—yet again conﬁrming that perceptions are more accurate than 
one might otherwise suspect.
We also ﬁnd that the control variables denoting the social and enactment of sensible 
environment properties of sensemaking—the most likely forms of bias and distor-
tion—are insigniﬁcant. This implies that executives do not look to IT spending pat-
terns, the size of their IT budget, or the performance of their largest competitors to 
infer what IT impacts they should be receiving from IT. Interestingly, sensemaking 
perceptions of IT impacts are positively associated with a strategic role for IT but 
negatively associated with perceptions of IT impacts when ﬁrms pursue a more util-
ity-based role for IT. This result is consistent with Tallon et al. [82], who found that 
ﬁrms with more focused or strategic goals for IT realize higher IT business value. 
Finally, sensemaking is also shaped by the interaction between IT and business 
executives consistent with previous research showing how closer cooperation leads 
to tighter alignment between IT and business strategy [66]. Interactions can mold 
executives’ attitudes toward IT but it could also suggest a causal relationship where 
IT executive involvement in business planning, executive committee meetings, and 
general outreach to users could help to improve IT impacts. Consequently, across all 
our results, there is a consistent indication that executives’ perceptions of the effect 
of IT on ﬁrm performance are not as susceptible to bias and perceptual distortion as 
researchers may have been led to believe.
Evaluating Perceptual Accuracy: Further Analysis
While the results in Figure 2 reveal that executives’ perceptions are more fact than 
ﬁction, we use Figure 3 to provide a further assessment of perceptual accuracy and 
to examine any possible confounding effects of common method bias in Figure 2. 
An application of sensemaking theory necessitates collection of data on noticing and 
sensemaking from the same individual, a situation that raises the risk of common 
method bias [62]. As seen in Figure 2, the coefﬁcient of H1 is high (0.727)—neces-
sarily so since theory calls for a tight link between noticing and sensemaking but also 
high enough to raise some concerns that common method bias could be adversely 
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shaping our results. In effect, common method bias could create a false appearance 
of perceptual accuracy, thus necessitating further review.
One approach to controlling for common method bias is to reestimate the model 
using objective measures as proxies for perceptual sensemaking measures. The re-
sults of this reestimation are shown in Figure 3, where objective measures are based 
on IT spending (sales per IT dollar, income per IT dollar, market share per rate of IT 
investment, and sales per employee) and IT capital (sales per IT capital dollar, income 
per IT capital dollar, market share per IT capital dollar, and sales per employee). As 
seen in Figure 3, support for H1 and H2 remains strong regardless of which type of 
objective measure is used.
Equally, sensemaking could incorporate certain nuances of IT impacts that might 
not be reﬂected in our objective measures [14]. For example, the retrospective nature 
of sensemaking allows executives to identify current IT impacts before these effects 
have had an opportunity to ﬂow through to the ﬁnancial statements—sensemaking 
is not conﬁned by accounting rules (such as the accruals or prudence concepts) that 
contribute to the time lag often associated with the detection of IT impacts on ﬁrm 
performance [14]. Sensemaking can also reﬂect strategic initiatives and management 
practices that are meant to improve IT conversion effectiveness, practices that might 
not be adequately reﬂected in a ratio such as income per IT dollar. Yet, even if these 
ratio-based measures are less than perfect and incapable of fully communicating the 
depth or richness of sensemaking, we should still expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correla-
tion between them and the various perceptual sensemaking measures they are said 
to represent.
As seen in Table 6, when we perform a correlation analysis–controlling for vari-
ous sensemaking biases noted previously in Table 2 (and used as control variables 
in Figure 2)—we ﬁnd several signiﬁcant correlations that point to the existence of 
perceptual accuracy. For example, if executives perceive that IT has had a positive 
effect on proﬁt margin, this is corroborated in virtually all objective measures, though 
particularly in income per IT dollar and productivity measures. If executives perceive 
that IT is helping to contain labor and SG&A costs, this is corroborated by a signiﬁ-
cant correlation with income per IT dollar, while executives’ perceptions that IT is 
boosting market share is corroborated by a signiﬁcant correlation with market share 
per rate of IT investment.
The net result of this analysis points to signiﬁcant positive correlations between 
perceptual and objective measures of IT impacts. We do not require very high cor-
relations to support this result since, as noted earlier, neither set of measures is an 
exact mirror image of the other, but what is critical, however, is a signiﬁcance level 
that shows that both sets of measures move in unison. Consequently, if the underly-
ing reality involves IT having a positive inﬂuence on ﬁrm performance, executives’ 
perceptions will conﬁrm as much but, if IT is not delivering on its promise, executives’ 
perceptions will show a sense of frustration and dissatisfaction. Overall, the key con-
clusion of this work is that perceptions are consistent with reality—a result that casts 
doubt on suspicions long held by IT researchers that perceptions of the effects of IT 
on ﬁrm performance are biased and distorted by any number of factors and so should 
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not be used in this domain of research. Such views have long denigrated perceptual 
measures [20], unnecessarily so in our view if in fact executives’ perceptions prove 
to be a close approximation of the reality underlying IT impacts.
Beyond Perceptual Accuracy: A Field Investigation
If our analysis could speak to IS researchers, it would simply ask that we not be so 
dismissive of perceptions, but this begs the question, “What do you do with perceptual 
measures of IT impacts now that we know that perceptions reﬂect reality?” While it 
is one thing to show perceptual accuracy across a broad sample of ﬁrms, the truth-
fulness and reality behind the views of any single executive are an entirely different 
matter. As seen in the properties of sensemaking in Table 1, sensemaking is a way 
for executives to project an image to the outside world [87], and so for researchers, 
there is an obvious question of trust, reliability, and consistency when it comes to 
relying on the views of a single executive. As argued earlier, seniority matters when 
it comes to noticing and sensemaking of IT impacts but one could also argue that, 
even with seniority, respondent selection is critical. Could some executives be more 
accurate than others?
Theoretically, this is an essential test of sensemaking, for if executives in the same 
ﬁrm notice the same things—as they should since each faces the same reality—then 
their sensemaking should come to a similar conclusion. Quite simply, we would be 
challenged to claim perceptual accuracy (notwithstanding our earlier results) if it 
occurred that executives in the same ﬁrm had dissimilar and potentially conﬂicting 
views on IT impacts in their ﬁrm. We must, therefore, ask whether executives in the 
same ﬁrm will notice the same IT impacts, both in terms of the level and locus of 
value, and form similar views as to the effect of IT on their overall ﬁrm performance. 
If executives maintain contradictory views on how much value IT is creating and 
where within the value chain that value is being realized, then we cannot make any 
useful inferences as to whether IT is delivering signiﬁcant value or not, but if there is 
consensus, then perceptions have intuitive meaning, enabling them to play a greater 
role in IT decision making. Consensus also means that no one executive’s opinions 
are superior to another’s, implying that researchers could look to different respondents 
as they strive to collect perceptual measures across organizations.
To investigate this issue further, we worked with CSC Index in identifying seven 
ﬁrms where we could distribute multiple copies of the survey to teams of senior 
executives; ﬁve of these ﬁrms were part of our original sample of 196. Six of the 
seven ﬁrms were ranked in the Fortune 500. The intention of this exercise was not to 
undertake an extensive survey but, rather, to explore through a small sample of ﬁrms 
whether consensus (interrater reliability) could be determined among a ﬁrm’s most 
senior cohort of business executives. After obtaining access to executives in each 
ﬁrm at SVP level or above, we mailed surveys to each executive with the request that 
they reply directly to us. From a population of 140 senior executives (all executive 
committee members) in these seven ﬁrms, we received 88 completed responses or 
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a 60 percent response rate. Survey items were identical to those used in the earlier 
business executive survey.
Agreement, or interrater reliability, among executives in each ﬁrm was assessed as an 
intraclass correlation coefﬁcient with two-way mixed effects [73]. While the number 
of survey items remains ﬁxed, respondents represent a sample of the executives in 
each ﬁrm. This calculation is computed separately for each ﬁrm rather than across the 
entire set of seven ﬁrms. Interrater reliability measures were ﬁrst applied to the survey 
items measuring IT impacts in different processes in the value chain, then to all survey 
items for all processes simultaneously, and ﬁnally to the sensemaking items capturing 
the effect of IT on ﬁrm performance. The results of this analysis appear in Table 7. 
Firms have been alphabetically labeled: ﬁrms A, F, and G are in ﬁnancial services, B 
is an energy utility, C manufactures paper and wood products, D produces consumer 
electronics, E is a telecom provider. Sample size data are also reported in Table 7.
Overall our results show a consistently high rate of interrater reliability within each 
ﬁrm for each of the primary processes in the value chain and the ﬁrm-level sensemaking 
items. This reveals that when senior executives are given a common framework for 
evaluating IT impacts (in the form of a survey) and are then asked to render an opinion 
on how their ﬁrm has performed in each dimension or area of IT value, executives 
within the same ﬁrm tend to respond in a similar manner. The fact that there is a pat-
tern of interrater reliability across all seven ﬁrms, while far from being representative 
of all ﬁrms, offers some reassurance that executives in the same ﬁrm notice and make 
sense of IT impacts in the same way. Again, this reveals that executives’ perceptions 
are more accurate and unbiased than perhaps previously thought.
Discussion and Implications
THE USE OF PERCEPTUAL MEASURES OF IT impacts has invoked widespread mistrust 
and suspicion of systematic or deliberate bias and error, even as researchers decry a 
dearth of easily accessible objective measures that can act as deﬁnitive measures of 
IT impacts. The aim of this research has not only been to ascertain the accuracy and 
reliability of executives’ perceptions but also to dissect and understand the cognitive 
processes that give rise to such perceptions. Sensemaking theory affords a unique 
opportunity to achieve both goals simultaneously, thus resolving a debate that has 
long plagued research in this area.
Researchers do not need an alternative approach to evaluating IT impacts inasmuch 
as they need a more accurate and reliable set of measures. While researchers have 
embraced process-level measures on the basis that the ﬁrst-order effects of IT arise 
at the process level, the challenge is that objective process measures are extremely 
difﬁcult to obtain [8] and so any additional reliability and validity can only come at 
enormous cost and inconvenience to the researcher, not to mention the loss of general-
ity that can ensue if process measures are industry or ﬁrm speciﬁc [47]. The fact that 
executives’ sensemaking yields valid, accurate, and reliable insights and that these 
insights are broadly shared by other executives from the same ﬁrm suggests that the 
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data behind sensemaking (i.e., what executives notice at the process level) can yield 
richer insights into IT impacts than what might be available at the ﬁrm level.
Notwithstanding the relative ease with which researchers can collect perceptual 
measures, we are not advocating that researchers stop collecting objective process 
measures, nor do we think that perceptual measures should replace objective mea-
sures—this is not an either objective or perceptual measures issue. There is, instead, 
a complementarity between each set of measures that forces us to question whether 
our tacit and continued rejection of soft perceptual measures in favor of hard objective 
measures is justiﬁable [20]. It may have been prudent to reject perceptual measures 
when accuracy was an unresolved issue, but to the extent that our research shows 
that the perception and reality of IT impacts are related, perhaps the time has come to 
reconsider our stance toward perceptual measures. Does this mean that perceptions 
can contribute to a new process-level measurement paradigm for IT impacts? We 
address this issue below.
Perception as Reality: A New Paradigm for IT Impact Analysis?
As the process level emerges as a focal point for research on IT impacts [7, 47], we 
are reminded that researchers face tremendous difﬁculty in ﬁnding objective process-
level data that ﬁrms are willing to share or that are not limited in some manner.10 As 
noted in literature reviews by Dehning and Richardson [25], Kohli and Devaraj [48] 
and Melville et al. [56], ﬁrm-level outcome measures such as sales or value added 
are key to determining the marginal effect of IT investment, but such measures fail to 
pinpoint the locus of value within the ﬁrm. Recognizing these limitations, perceptual 
measures provide an opportunity to lift the lid on the black box of how and where IT 
creates value within the ﬁrm. As our analysis reveals, process-level perceptual mea-
sures not only distinguish between low and high effects, but can also reveal the locus 
of value at a more granular level in the ﬁrm. Consequently, perceptual measures have 
remedial value should the level and locus of IT value be insufﬁcient or inconsistent 
with the goals of the ﬁrm [82].
Chan [20] notes that a reluctance to consider more qualitative approaches to IT im-
pact assessment has created a schism between qualitative and quantitative measures 
and the research camps that favor one type of measure over another. Our research 
does not especially favor one side of the divide over another. Qualitative and quantita-
tive measures are equally informative and imperfect, given the often subjective and 
highly complex nature of IT impacts. Overall, our intent in this research has been to 
bridge this divide and, in so doing, establish credibility for executives’ perceptions 
as an emergent—though still underutilized—approach to IT impact analysis. Being 
able to show that perceptions are accurate is an important ﬁrst step toward building 
credibility around a diverse set of process-level measures.
Sensemaking theory represents a marked departure from traditional thinking about 
IT impacts as a cause-and-effect relationship linking variables such as IT spending or 
IT capital to productivity or other ﬁrm-level performance outcomes. As Weick notes, 
“to talk about sensemaking is to talk about reality as an ongoing accomplishment that 
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takes form when people make retrospective sense of the situations in which they ﬁnd 
themselves and their creations” [87, p. 15]. Sensemaking does not (and likely cannot) 
answer the question of how ﬁrms realize value from IT or what management practices 
ﬁrms should implement to boost their level of realized impacts. However, in terms 
of selecting dependent variables that can serve as close approximations of reality, 
sensemaking or perceptual measures, particularly at the process level, can (with the 
inclusion of controls for perceptual bias or distortion as used in this study) begin to 
unravel the link between predictors of value (management practices, strategic align-
ment, IT resources, or capabilities) and value-based outcomes in ways that traditional 
ﬁrm-level objective measures have been unable to do.
Contribution of the Research
This research contributes to the extant literature on IT business value in three ways. 
First, we use sensemaking theory to show that executives’ perceptions of IT impacts 
at both the process and ﬁrm levels are sufﬁciently accurate, credible, and unbiased 
as to constitute a viable approach to IT impact assessment. Executives’ perceptions 
have been found credible in areas such as evaluating environmental uncertainty [39] 
or relative ﬁrm performance [26, 85]. However, perceptions of IT impacts pose a very 
different set of challenges that prevent extrapolation of perceptual accuracy from these 
other studies. As the ﬁrst study to directly confront the issue of perceptual accuracy 
in an IT business value context, we dispel the myth held by many IS researchers that 
perceptions are inherently biased and untrustworthy. It is natural to think that per-
ceptions may be self-serving, but at a time when it is increasingly difﬁcult to collect 
primary data on IT impacts, particularly at the process level, perceptual accuracy 
prompts greater use of perceptual measures.
Our second contribution reﬂects the ability of perceptions to report on the level 
and locus of IT impacts in a single ﬁrm. While our analysis revealed the presence of 
perceptual accuracy across a sample of ﬁrms, it was equally important to ascertain if 
the perceptions of a single respondent in each ﬁrm would reﬂect the collective views 
of all executives. Through additional analyses of surveys from teams of senior execu-
tives across seven ﬁrms, we found through interrater reliability tests that executives 
tend to agree with each other as to the level and locus of IT impacts. Consequently, 
perceptual measures have the ability to provide new and useful insights into a wide 
variety of IT impacts across the ﬁrm. Together with our ﬁrst contribution, this result 
offers some encouragement to IS researchers who want to use perceptions of IT impacts 
in their research but are uncertain if multiple respondents are necessary or not. This 
issue is moot as regards objective measures but cannot be overlooked when perceptual 
measures are used. Our ﬁndings would not discourage use of multiple respondents, 
but consensus across executives in the same ﬁrm offers some evidence that multiple 
respondents may not be needed to justify using perceptual measures.
Our ﬁnal contribution reﬂects our use of sensemaking theory. While sensemaking 
has been used previously in the IS literature [34, 46, 70], this is the ﬁrst time that 
sensemaking has been used to examine IT impacts and the cognitive processes behind 
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the noticing and sensemaking of IT impacts. What emerges from our use of the theory 
is validation of prior arguments by Starbuck and Milliken [77] and Weick [87] that 
noticing (the act of identifying facts, peer evaluations, expectations, and other key 
informational cues) and sensemaking (combining and ﬁltering these various elements 
into a plausible interpretation of reality) are tightly intertwined. For executives who 
rely on their gut to make key investment decisions or to assess the adequacy of post-
investment effects, our results suggest that executives’ instincts are not wrong [5].11
Implications for Practice and Research
Our ﬁndings are directly relevant to business and IT practitioners who need to evaluate 
IT impacts but who receive relatively little guidance from the large-sample studies 
that have dominated the IS literature to this point [38]. To the extent that executives 
within the same ﬁrm share a common set of views on what IT has achieved or perhaps 
failed to achieve, there is the potential to begin using these perceptions to benchmark 
IT impacts over time, perhaps in response to a new wave of IT investment [69]. As 
Bannister and Remenyi [5] report, IT value is still very much an act of faith for many 
ﬁrms that, even with some rudimentary cost-beneﬁt analysis, typically fail to do any 
form of postimplementation audit to detect if IT is delivering what is expected of it. 
Where ﬁrms decline to do postimplementation audits on the basis that there are insuf-
ﬁcient data to inform their analysis [69, 82], perceptions could begin to play a more 
open and direct role in their post hoc benchmarking and evaluation efforts.
Our work also has implications for researchers. Despite the attractiveness and 
relative availability of perceptions, we emphasize that perceptions are not a panacea. 
Perceptions are accurate and credible but this fact alone does not make them univer-
sally applicable in all research—perceptions can only tell us so much; perceptions in 
isolation could never have debunked the productivity paradox! Econometric studies 
and time series analyses are still key to understanding input substitution and how 
inputs (IT capital, non-IT capital, and labor) are transformed into outputs (sales, 
value added). However, beyond asking if there is a payoff from IT, Chan argues that 
the “why, where, when, how, and to whom [questions involving IT impacts] . . . may 
require an examination of a variety of qualitative and quantitative measures [that] 
ultimately require us to unite the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ camps, and the ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
camps” [20, p. 245, emphasis in original]. What this means is that while perceptions 
may be helpful in providing insight into research questions for which econometric 
analysis may be awkward, researchers should give consideration to using both objective 
and perceptual data when necessary. For example, in process-level studies, whatever 
objective measures exist could be supplemented with perceptual data to render a more 
comprehensive account of IT impacts.
There is also some potential to extend our research in several directions. For example, 
our process items (see Table 4) are not exhaustive of all possible process-level effects. 
Future research could extend and reﬁne this list through industry- or process-speciﬁc 
analysis. There is also some question as to whether executive seniority is essential to 
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perceptual accuracy. For example, is it better to collect perceptual data from multiple 
function-level managers who may be more knowledgeable of IT impacts in speciﬁc 
parts of the ﬁrm than to rely on the opinions of one or more senior executives? Fu-
ture research could also tap into the retrospective nature of sensemaking in order to 
determine how quickly executives can detect a change in performance due to a new 
investment or an increase in spending—research by Devaraj and Kohli [27] highlights 
the importance of such analysis in showing how time lags affect the search for value. 
At a time when ﬁrms are calling for progressively shorter payback periods on their 
IT spending—in part because of the “IT Doesn’t Matter” debate [19]—there is some 
doubt as to whether year-end ﬁnancial data can conﬁrm if IT is delivering value or 
not. Perceptual measures may provide an answer to this dilemma.
Limitations
Our research suffers from several weaknesses and limitations. First, in asking CIOs 
to forward a survey of IT impacts to a business executive, there was a risk that CIOs 
could select their best customer—someone who could be trusted to give a positive 
view of IT regardless of the underlying reality. While our overall ﬁnding of percep-
tual accuracy would discount a systematic “best customer effect” in our data—an 
effect that would increase the gap between perception and reality by driving down 
the correlation between objective and perceptual measures—individual exceptions 
are always possible. From our later analysis of responses from multiple executives 
in the same ﬁrms, high interrater reliabilities conﬁrm that executives tend not to hold 
deﬂated or inﬂated views of IT impacts, and so there is no evidence to say that in 
asking CIOs to help identify a business executive respondent, this somehow distorted 
or predetermined our results. It may also be argued, however, that perceptual value is 
“in the eye of the beholder.” The beholder must be in a position to observe sufﬁcient 
information with which to form an opinion. The point is not to have an opinion, per 
se, but to have a valid basis for having that opinion. All too often, whether through a 
sense of indifference toward IT or failure on the part of IT executives to reach out to 
their business peers, business executives struggle to perceptually identify how much 
value IT is generating for their ﬁrms. Value can exist in an objective sense but with 
echoes of the saying that “if a tree falls in the forest, does it make a sound?” if value 
cannot be perceptually identiﬁed, there may be an assumption that IT has failed in its 
mission. Mindful of the ensuing political fallout, there may be a need for IS execu-
tives to use a tool to detect any gap between perception and reality. In the domain 
of service quality, the marketing literature offers some insights into how such a tool 
(SERVQUAL) might be designed and implemented [45].
A further limitation involves our choice of objective measures of IT impacts to act 
as proxies for our perceptual sensemaking measures. Selecting suitable objective 
measures was a challenge, but without some consideration of objective measures, it 
would be difﬁcult to assess perceptual accuracy. Even then, one needs to be careful 
with ratio-based measures that relate outputs to inputs such as sales per IT dollar. While 
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we adjusted objective measures to reﬂect deviation from industry averages, a broader 
limitation of our research is whether the four measures we used were sufﬁcient. These 
measures may be suitable in a multi-industry study, but other measures may be more 
appropriate in industry-speciﬁc studies. One could also question whether sales per 
employee is an appropriate measure of productivity when sales is but one measure of 
output. When output prices are subject to decline, as for example in the electronics 
industry, it may appear that productivity is falling, whereas in reality IT is helping to 
accelerate production unit output.
The focus of this study was large ﬁrms (median 1998 sales: $3 billion), and so 
we caution against extrapolating our results to small and medium-sized ﬁrms. This 
limitation is especially important in terms of how business executives establish an 
expectation for what is an average IT impact. In pilot testing our survey, we asked 
executives to interpret the midpoint (5–6) on the 10-point scale used in the IT impact 
survey. It was clear from their comments that this midpoint reﬂected a separation be-
tween success (high effect) and failure (low effect) but that success or failure hinged 
upon what many considered “normal” in their industry. If executives anchor their 
expectations and perceptions of what IT has achieved against a benchmark that is set 
by industry peers and potentially by their desire to imitate IT success stories at ﬁrms 
such as Dell, FedEx, and Wal-Mart, then what might be judged as high IT impact 
in small ﬁrms could be judged as inadequate in large ﬁrms. By limiting our study to 
large ﬁrms, we hoped to control for this possibility. Our sample was also drawn from 
CSC’s consulting clients—a group whose executives are arguably more IT-savvy and, 
therefore, in a better position to realistically assess their IT impacts.
A ﬁnal limitation involves timing issues of IT impact recognition. Other than asking 
respondents to focus on realized rather than expected effects from IT—consistent with 
the retrospective property of sensemaking—respondents were not asked to conﬁne 
their perceptions to a predeﬁned period of time. A potential downside of this is that 
some executives might limit their noticing to the recent past while others consider a 
longer time frame. Our use of IT capital measures is an attempt to resolve this issue, 
and while our results in Figure 2 do not appear to have been biased by the possibility 
of different time frames, timing would be an issue for ﬁrms trying to benchmark or 
infer substantive meaning from their perceptions.
Conclusion
THIS RESEARCH REPRESENTS AN OPPORTUNITY to bridge the divide between qualitative and 
quantitative research traditions by combining perceptual and objective metrics in a way 
that is mindful of the strengths and limitations of each. Where mismeasurement of IT 
impacts has been blamed in part for the appearance of a productivity paradox [14], 
the use of perceptual measures provides an opportunity for researchers to devise new 
measures that highlight a variety of IT impacts at the process level, thereby reducing 
the risk that mismeasurement will allow key IT impacts to “fall through the cracks.” 
To the extent that executives’ perceptions are characterized as qualitative, they have 
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suffered from the schism that has formed between quantitative (hard) and qualitative 
(soft) measures [7, 20]. Over time, there has been a tendency to rebuff perceptual 
measures out of a sincere belief that these measures are more ﬁction than fact. We do 
not deny that perceptual bias is a signiﬁcant challenge facing researchers who wish 
to use perceptual measures [57, 80], but our results show that with careful attention 
to respondent selection and a valid survey instrument, as noted by Miller et al. [58], 
it is possible to use perceptions to glean important insights into IT impacts. As such, 
our results echo a sentiment that is gaining ground in other areas of the academic 
literature—that executives are more accurate and consistent in their views than previ-
ously thought [44, 53, 58].
Few researchers would disagree that IT impact analysis is a complex task, particularly 
when there is an expectation that, in order to be valuable, IT must contribute to ﬁrm 
performance in a way that can be detected in the ﬁnancial statements [10]. Alas, the 
simplicity and stricture of ﬁnancial reporting belie the complexity of how IT can fun-
damentally alter the dynamics of business operations and ﬁrm performance. As active 
participants in the everyday activities of ﬁrms, executives implicitly form perceptions 
of how IT is helping them to achieve their strategic and tactical goals. By tapping 
these perceptions and conﬁrming that they are credible and accurate, we can supple-
ment what we have learned from econometric and other quantitative analysis by using 
perceptions to develop richer insights into the level and locus of IT impacts. With the 
expectation that ﬁrms are likely to be more willing to share perceptual insights than 
conﬁdential objective data (if they exist), our hope is that researchers will give some 
thought to using perceptions more openly to generate new insights into process-level 
IT impacts. Such a move would help to bridge the great divide that deﬁnes much of 
the extant literature on IT impacts and that has sadly constrained the practical merits 
of this research in the eyes of many practitioners.
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NOTES
1. As detailed by Weick [87], among the factors motivating sensemaking theory was an 
attempt to understand how jurors reach a verdict. Even though jurors are presented with the 
same facts and legal opinion, hung juries are not uncommon; guilty or not-guilty verdicts are 
earnestly defended by persons on the same jury who can cite a litany of facts to support their 
views. Sensemaking theory offers a way to reconcile perceptions with the evidence that jurors 
accept or dismiss in reaching their verdict. Similarly, sensemaking theory says that whatever 
executives perceive about aggregate IT impacts must emerge from the facts that they have 
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noticed or cognitively gathered in rendering their judgment. Another way of viewing this is to 
say that, like jurors, executives will always be able to substantiate their perceptions by pointing 
to speciﬁc informational cues. If their perceptions are found to be valid and reliable, we can use 
what they noticed to improve our understanding of how IT creates value within the ﬁrm.
2. Merriam-Webster online edition (www.m-w.com).
3. Although we do not identify in this paper if there are differences in perceptions of IT 
impacts between executives with different levels of seniority, it is an issue that is certainly 
worthy of consideration. If the level of noticing is at the application level, it may be preferable 
to collect perceptions from multiple managers with responsibility for the performance of each 
application (e.g., project managers or application owners). If the level of noticing is at a higher 
level within the ﬁrm, such as at the process level, the need for multiple respondents may not be 
as critical if senior executives with visibility into diverse business processes are able to report 
on IT impacts in several parts of the value chain.
4. Although Weick [87] lists eight reasons for why plausibility is unlikely to coincide with 
accuracy, only the ﬁrst three reasons are relevant to this study since we are looking at retrospec-
tive IT impacts rather than future effects.
5. A positive effect of IT on ﬁrm performance is reﬂected in a positive effect on margin and 
market share but a negative effect on labor and SG&A costs as a percentage of sales. To ensure 
consistency in the design of our dependent variables (for later use in structural modeling), we 
applied a negative sign to the data collected from the S&P Compustat database for labor and 
SG&A costs.
6. We also separately tested a model whose dependent variables were based on measures of 
return on investment (ROI), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and asset turnover 
(total assets divided by sales). The results from that alternative model are structurally identical 
to the results produced in this paper.
7. PLSGraph was used instead of covariance-based structural modeling because of small 
sample size issues. Using a rule of thumb of 10 observations per variable or measured item, 
we would need a sample size of approximately 400. A smaller sample size of 196 does not 
rule out covariance-based modeling using applications such as EQS, AMOS, or LISREL, but 
since PLS is less restricted by small sample size [21], we opted to perform all analysis in PLS 
instead, speciﬁcally PLSGraph V.3. Using the technique outlined by Chin and Newsted [21], 
we found that statistical power for the models in Figures 2 and 3 is 1.00—greater than the 
recommended minimum of 0.8 [22].
8. This form of factor analysis is more conﬁrmatory in nature since the structure of the fac-
tors and items are known in advance. To conﬁrm that this structure was appropriate, we also 
performed an exploratory factor analysis in SPSS with principal components extraction and 
varimax rotation. Using the eigenvalue rule, the resulting nine-factor structure (79.0 percent 
cumulative variance explained) was identical to the conﬁrmatory factor structure tested in 
PLSGraph. Using Harman’s one-factor test as a potential indicator of common method bias, we 
reviewed the variance explained by each factor. The ﬁrst factor explained 38.4 percent of the 
overall variance, which would suggest that common method bias is not present in our data.
9. We also tested our model to identify if our results would be different if ﬁve separate 
paths were used instead. While this made for a more cluttered model, the overall structure of 
our results remains unchanged.
10. For example, the Management Productivity and Information Technology (MPIT) data 
set used by Barua et al. [8] in one of the earliest process-level studies is limited in terms of 
sample size (60 strategic business units in 20 large ﬁrms), industry scope (manufacturing 
primarily), and duration (data were collected from 1979 to 1983). Information Week 100 data 
used by Bharadwaj [9] and others to study the effects of superior IT resources and capabilities 
are also now dated since, beginning in the late 1990s, Information Week has stopped collect-
ing IT budget data.
11. In a series of case study interviews accompanying this research, an airline IT executive 
with an unusual grasp of IT business value research remarked, “I know what marginal product 
means [referring to productivity studies], but I can’t take that to my CFO and say, ‘see, I told 
you our IT is paying off.’ There’s no way for me to use these [productivity] studies to infer 
anything about the state of IT business value in my ﬁrm. I still have to rely on my gut and 
whatever numbers we can come up with internally.”
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